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CASE COMMENTS
Comrm-r--CwvI
CoNmPT DFlnqED-R-C nm A
CoNTirmmT DFWITHOUT AUTHORrY TO REQUIRE SPECTATOR I COURT
ROOM TO A&SwER QUESTIONS CONCERNING ME BERSHIP nT Ku KLux KLrA.
-On March 7, 1924, K. was a spectator in Laurel circuit court. He
was called from the auditorium of the court room to the bar of the
court while it was in session and was sworn by the judge of the court
to testify concerning certain violations of the law In Laurel county-of
which he might have knowledge. K. was asked by court if he was -an
organizer of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, and upon his replying
in affirmative was requested by the court to furnish names of those
whom he knew were members of the order in Laurel county. K. refused to do this and court punished him for contempt of court with a
sentence of thirty hours' imprisonment in jail. A like sentence was imposed when K. refused to answer the question upon being called before court again. The court then had a jury empaneled for the purpose of having K. punished for contempt of court. The judge peremptorily directed the jury to find K. guilty of the offense charged.
In his instruction, the court stated there had been some acts constituting breaches of peace, and other acts in which parties, including
the judge, had been threatened by letters, etc.; that the Ku Klux Klan
appeared to have been connected with the doings; that the grand jury
were seemingly stifled and hindered in Investigating the doings; and
that, therefore, the court had taken the duty of investigating the matter
into its own hands and had called K. to testify in furtherance of that
purpose. The jury found K. guilty of contempt of court and subjected
him to fine and imprisonment. Judgment reversed on appeal. Ketcham
v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 168.

rnm>--CUnT

In Brannon v. Commonwealt, 162 Ky. 350, the court said: "Such
acts or conduct as will amount to disrespect of, or indignity to the
judge or court, or interference with 'or disobedience of the processes,
orders or judgment of a court, or some obstruction of the due and
proper administration of justice in a pending case, or some misconduct of an officer of a court, will constitute contempt of court." This
definition referred to criminal, contempt. "Civil contempts are those
quasi contempts which consist in failing to to something which the
contemnor is ordered by the court to do for the benefit or advantage
of another party to the proceeding before the court." French v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. L. R. 98.
Contempt of court goes als6-to the refusal of a witness to testify
or answer proper questions: '"Unless the rule is otherwise by statute,
a witness is in contempt'who refuses to.testify or to make answer to
proper questions when under the examination before the court, grand
jury, . . . unless there is an entire want of jurisdictin on the
part of the court, tribunal, or officer'before whom the witness .s called
on to testify. However, subject t6 such statutory changes or modifications as may exist, to constitute such contempt the question asked the

'308

KEmNrucy LIw Jou=AL

witness must be a proper and legal one and the evidence sought must
be pertinent or material to some of the issues in the case." Flower v.
MacGinniss, 112 Fed. 377; People v. Cassels, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 164; In re
Pierce, 46 Vt. 374; Rogers v. San Francisco Super. Ct., 145 Cal. 88;
People v. Heintz, 167 Ill. A. 550; Shorwitz v. Caminez, 152 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 758.
The questions then, to determine in the principal case, are: (1)
Whether the court was acting within its jurisdiction in propounding
the question to K. which K. declined to answer; (2) whether the question asked was a proper and legal one; (3) whether the evidence
sought was pertinent or material to some of the issues in the case. To
all of these questions the Court of Appeals answered in the negative.
An observation of the circumstances attending the case will show that
the upper court decided correctly.
The circuit judge had no 'authority to conduct a court of inquiry
for the purpose of determining whether the law has been violated. It
is clearly settled that the province of tue circuit court is limited to
the trial of prosecutions in criminal matters and does not Include
the conducting of such prosecutions. The power of holding an inquisitioh or an investigation vests entirely in the grand jury and has
been imposed in that body for centuries both in England and in this
country. It is plainly evident, then, that the circuit court transcended
its authority in attempting individually, to conduct the inquisition.
Aldrich v. Maher, 153 Ill. App. 413; Drew v. Hogan, 26 App. D. C. 55;
Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120; Peo. v. McCarthy, 59 App. Div. 231.
The question propounded was not a legal and proper one nor was
the evidence sought material to the issue of any case then being tried,
because K. at the time the question was put to him was not a witness
in any case, civil or criminal, then being tried in the circuit court, and
the information sought by the judge was not relevant to any issue of
any action then being tried in the court. It is interesting to note that
K. has Instituted a suit against the judge of the Laurel circuit court
for $50,000.00 for the improper proceedings adopted and the excessive
punishment imposed by the judge upon him.
M. F.

'vIDENcE-PHYsIOIAn1s OPiNIoN DERIvED FEuoiPLAINTIFF'S STATFE
:MENTS NOT IN THE COUnsn OF TREATENT-HYPOTHnrIOAL

QUESTIONS,

ASSUMING FACTS Nor In EvIDmxcz.-Plaintiff was a member of an extra
gang, employed by the defendant in laying new rails. While on his
way to work, in company of ten other men, the gasoline motor hand
car on which he was riding, collided with another car carrying a.
crew, going in the opposite direction. At the time, he refused to have
a physician attend him, but went to work and continued to work from
Saturday until the following Tuesday, when he went home and did not
return for three weeks, at which time his place was filled. He admitted.that while at home, he had worked upon his farm, manufactured
cross-ties, loaded, hauled, unloaded and delivered them to three different people, he had never called a doctor but at times, after doing
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heavy work his back would hurt him. There was no evidence of a
bruise on his body. The plaintiff introduced, as witnesses, two physicians; each made his first examination at or about the time when
the case was set for trial and six months after the collision. Each
testified that they were enabled to discover tenderness of the back bstatements and actions of the plaintiff, because of his flinching and
stiffness in walking. When asked whether the condition found when
he made his examination could have resulted from sudden shock or
application of force to plaintiff's body, he said that it could have been
produced by "a fall out of a barn loft or slip over the pavement." The
plaintiff seeks to recover for permanent injury.
The case under discussion held that expert testimony of a physician, as to plaintiff's injuries, consisting entirely of his opinion derived not from objective symptoms but from statements of the plaintiff, during examination, made for the purpose of testifying in an action, is incompetent. In personal injury actions, hypothetical questions based upon the hypothesis that sudden shock or application of
force to the plaintiff's body have been shown, for which there was no
support in the evidence are improper. Mll. Cent. B. B. v. Townsen, 206
Ky. 329, 267 S. W. 161.
The majority of courts hold that testimony by a physician as to
the plaintiff's injury, based on no objective appearance but solely on
the plaintiff's -statement as to the nature of the injuries made in the
course of examination for sole purpose of enabling the physician to
testify, is incompetent. Baltimore and Ohio B. Co. v. Mangus, 294
Fed. 761. A Massachusetts case, on the contrary, holds that the testimony of the physician in regard to the statements made by the plaintiff was admissible. Cronin v. Fitchburg & L. St. By. Co., 181 Mass.
202, 63 N. E. 335. Kentucky follows the majority rule, 151 Ky. 313,
151 S. W. 950.
As to the admission of the answer to the hypothetical question,
where there is evidence from which the jury could find facts on which
an hypothetical question was based, this question may be admitted.
Mfieh ke .v. 2assau ec. B. Co., 129 App. Div. 438, 114 N. Y. S. 90.
'Where the hypothetical question of an alienist did not contain a
statement of all facts upon which there was some evidence regarding
the testatrix's state of mind and the question embraced some assumptions of which theri was no proof, the answer was not competent. Gay
v. Gay, 183 Ky. 238, 209 S. W. 11.
-B. K. M.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-CARRYING

NOT TRANsPoRTIioN WrrIN

THE

LIQUOR IN

PROHIB1TIoN

ON'S

STOMACH IIELD

AcT.-Appellant

was

found guilty of transporting intoxicating liquor and he appealed from
the judgment. The evidence in substance was as follows: Tie appellant who had been shot went to the house of A. to wait for a doctor.
A saw a pint bottle at his bedside which contained a clear white liquid.
At the trial she testified that she did not touch or smell the bottle,
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and did not know what it contained. Other witnesses state that by
close examination the liquid in the bottle was not liquor. While the
appellant was at A.'s house he threw up and several persons who were
present testified that the vomit smelled like liquor. The appellant
stated that he had drunk some California beer earlier in the morning
and that accounted for the smell of the vomit. Judgment reversed.
Held, that carrying liquor in one's stomach is not transportation within
the meaning of the prohibition act. Bus& v. Commonwealth, 266 S. W.
1046, 206 Ky. 151.
Section 2554a-1 of the Kentucky Statutes provides: That it shall
be unlawful to manufacture, sell, barter, give away, or keep for sale,
or transport, spirituous, vinous, malt or intoxicating liquors except for
sacramental, medicinal, scientific or mechanical purposes in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. To sustain the charge under this statute, it
was necessary for the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the bottle which the appellant carried contained intoxicating
liquor. By the evidence established this was not done, so the only
question that remained was whether carrying liquor in one's stomach
was transportation or not. In Cunnard SS. Co., Ltd, v. Mellon, the
word transportation was taken in its ordinary sense. And in that
sense it comprehends any real carrying about from one place to another. Therefore if one carries in his own conveyance for his own
purposes it is transportation no less than when a public carrier at the
instance of a consignor carries and delivers to a consignee for a stipulated charge. United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 4651, 40 Sup. Ct. 364.
The definition of transportation in its ordinary sense seems to be the
movement of liquor by the accused on his person or in some vehicle
-A. T.
under his control. West v. State, (Tex.) 24 S. W. 31.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-NEW TENANoy Pon YAn AT INcREASED RENnT
CREATED BY HOLDING OVER-FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-CREATION OF Nxw
LEASE sY HOLDING OvEa NOT WITHIN STATUTE.-Appellee, pwner of a
building, leased a fiat by a written contract to appellant for one year.
Appellant occupied the flat throughout his term. Before the expiration of the term, the lessor notified the lessee by letter that after the
expiration of his term there would be an increase of fifteen ($15.00)
dollars per month rental on the property. The lessee did not agree to
the increase, but held over for four months after the expiration of his
original lease, paying the lessor monthly rent in advance at the increased rate. At the end of the four months, the lessee vacated the
premises. Appellee brought suit to recover from appellant rent on the
flat for the remaining eight months of the year at the increased rental,
and judgment was rendered accordingly. Upon appeal the judgment
was affirmed. Abraham v. Gheens, 205 Ky. 289, 265 -S.W. 778.
It is provided by section 2295, of the Kentucky Statutes (1922),
that if by contract a term or tenancy for a year or more is to expire
on a certain day, by holding over beyond his term, a tenant acquires
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no rights and assumes no liability during the 90 days succeeding the
expiration of the term, during all of which time he may be treated as
a trespasser and ousted of possession by the landlord; but it is further
provided that if he holds over more than ninety days, no action having
been taken to oust him, the original lease'thereupon thereby shall be
extended in all its terms for an additional year from the expiration of
the term, both landlord and tenant 'being bound. The statute seems to
limit and control the common law principles already in force. A notice
by a landlord to a tenant that if he continues to occupy the premises
beyond the present term he must pay an increased rent, naming the
sum, will bind the tenant, where he expressly or impliedly consents to
such increase of rent; and such assent will be implied, where a tenant,
holding over after his lease, remains in possession after a notice from
his landlord that a greater rent than that stipulated in the lease will
be required, and to that extent the old lease will not apply. Meater v.
Pomeroy, 49 Ala. 146; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411; Refthman v.
Brandenburg,7 Col. 480, 4 Pac. 788; Hunt v. Bailey, 39 Mo. 257; Despard
v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. 374; Moore v. Harter,67 Ohio St. 250; Amsden
v. Blaisdell, 60 Vt. 386; Miller v. Lerner, 205 Ill. App. 591; Silverman
v. Zucker, 181 N. Y. S. 349; Crowder v. Virginian Bank of Commerce,
127 Va. 299, 103 S. E. 578; Cowell v. Snyder, 15 Cal. App. 634, 115 Pac.
961. In the present case the lessor sent the lessee a written notice of
the advance in rent, to begin at the expiration of his lease, which resulted in a heated argument over the rent, but ended without lessee
consenting thereto. In the case of Brinkley v. Wolcott, 10 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 22, the court held that the tenant becomes liable for the rent
for another year at the increased rate though on the notice of the increase of the rent he has notified his landlord that he remains under
protest and only until he can secure another place. The tenant's conduct in continuing in possession after notice by the landlord is an acceptance of the landlord's proposition. Underhill on Landlord & Tenant, VoI. 1, Sec. 99. Whether he becomes a tenant for another term-is
entirely for the election of the landlord, who may treat him as a trespasser or a tenant, but the tenant has no election if he remains in possession (ninety days being allowed the tenant as a trespasser by Ky.
Stat., Sec. 2295), but he is subject to the will of the landlord in the
matter, even though he desired to abandon the lease and had secured
other premises. Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 309, 10 Am. Rep. 609; MacGregor v. Rawle, 57 Pa. 184; Bacon v. Brown, 9 Conn. 334.
The contract between the parties does not have to be in writing
required by the statute of frauds, as urged by appellant. It has been
held that an oral lease for a year to begin at a future date falls within
the statute and is void unless in writing. Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370,
72 N. E. 1070; Crommelin v. Thiess, 31 Ala. 412, 70 Am. Dec. 499;
loyd v. Dumphrey, 9 Ky. Opinions 35; Gault v. Carpenter,187 Ky. 25,
218 S. W. 254. In'the principal case the lessor's notice to the lessee
of the increased rent was the offer for the new agreement and the
lessee did not accept it, so that the contract was not binding, until he
held over and paid rent at the increased rate, which, could not have
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been earlier than the bginning of the new term. Hence, it could not
have been a contract for a lease for a year to begin at a future date.
Contracts that may be performed within a year are valid, although
not In writing. Stowers v. Hallus, 83 Ky. 544; Howard v. Burgen, 4
Dana 137; Myles v. Myles, 6 Bush 237; Fain v. Turner, 96 Ky. 634; 29
S. W. 628; Dickey v. Dickinson, 105 Ky. 748, 49 S. W. 761; East Tenn.
-Tel. Co. v. ParisElectric Co.. 156 Ky. 763, 162 S. W. 530. Even a great
number of jurisdictions have held that a parol lease to take effect in
futuro is not within the statute of frauds and is therefore valid, construing the statute to mean the commencement of the term and not
the time of the performance of the contract, with reference to the
entering into same. Young v. Dake, 5 N. Y. 463, 55 Am. Dec. 356; Whiting v. Ohlert, 52 Mich. 462, 18 N. W. 219; Becar v. Flues, 64 N. Y. 518;
Hobey v. Brisbee, 20 Iowa 105; Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576, 15 Am.
Rep. 278.
In accord with the authorities cited above the court held that a
new tenancy for a year at increased rent was created by the tenant's
holding over, and that the creation of the new lease by holding over
was not within th statute of frauds.
-W. F. S.

LmurL AND SLANDE -Allegation that the defendant spoke concerning the plaintiff, an unmarried female employed in the store of one
Stevens, "They say that B. is having or has had improper relations
with the girl that works in his store." Held, to sufficiently charge imputation of unchastity and to be libelous per se. Holman v. Plumlec,
206 Ky. 275, 267 S. W. 465.
In the case hereinabove referred to the defendant demurred to the
original petition on the grounds that the spoken words were not actionable per se, and that as special damages were not alleged there
could be no recovery. At common law there were only five classes of
cases in which slanderous words orally spolen, were per se actionable.
They are set out and discussed in the case of Williams v. Riddle, 145
Ky. 459, where the authorities are collected. At common law it was
not per se slanderous to charge a female with adultery or fornication.
In the case of White v. Martin, 188 Ky. 153, the court said: "The
only reason assigned in the books for this harsh, strange, and inexcusable conditipn of the common law is that the temporal courts did
not have jurisdiction of the offenses of adultery and fornication, they
being cognizable exclusively in the ecclesiastical, courts. But enlightened jurisprudence has come along and has offered a remedy to
the defects of the common law."
Kentucky, like many other states, has, by statute, abolished the
harsh rule of the common law, declaring that a false charge of fornication or adultery made against a female will constitute actionable
slander. The Kentucky legislative enactment is contained in section 1
of the Kentucky Statutes and is as follows: "A charge of incest,
fornication or adultery against a female shall Ae actionable; and In
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such cases the plaintiff shall not be held to allege or prove special
damage"
In the case of Adams v. Rankin, 1 Duvall 58, we find an application and construction of the revised statute, 'supra, which is substantially a re-enactment of the act of 1811, on the same subject, an
application and construction which set forth the principle that "In
an action for slander when the spoken words are actionable, the plaintiff need not allege or prove special damage."
The same interpretation of the revised statute has been adhered
to most strictly by our Kentucky courts. Nickelson v. Dunn, 21 R. 653,
and Morris v. Curtis, 20 R. 56, are both authoritative on the point,
holding that in an action for slander based on the above mentioned
statute, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege or prove special
damage, and that malice may be implied from the false speaking of
slanderous words which are actionable per se, proof of expressed malice
not being necessary.
So it can be seen that in our courts the statute, supra, has wholly
repudiated the common law rule and has held that words imputing unchastity to a female are actionable per se. But Kentucky is far from
being alone on this repudiation of the ancient doctrine. Jackson v.
Williams, 92 Ark. 486; Curling v. Handerman, 117 Iowa, 637; Burnett
v. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 107; Preston v. Frey, 91 Cal. 107; Burke v.
Stewart, 81 Ill. A. 506; Battler v. Tyson, 77 Neb. 563, all hold that by
force of statutory provisions oral language charging unchastity is now
-.
J. M.
actionable per se.

MASTEn AND SEnv -xT-LiBLITY OF PARENT ron INJURY BY FAMnY
AUT0MOBILE DRIvEN BY SON-CONSENT.--W., 13 year old son of S., took
S.'s car from the garage at night without the knowledge or consent of
S. and against his positive instructions and, with companions about his
own age, went for a joy ride. While driving the car, W. ran it against
a buggy of A. in which A. was riding, throwing her out of the vehicle
and causing her severe injury. It was not the custom for W. to drive
the car. A. sued the father to recover for injuries sustained. Judgment for A. Appeal by S. and judgment reversed. Sale v. Atkins, 206
Ky. 224, 267 S. W. 223.
At common law it is well established that the mere relation of
parent and child imposes on the parent no liability for the torts of
the child committed without his knowledge or authority, express or
implied. Paulin v. Howser, 63 Ill. 312; Moon v. Towers, 8 0. B. (N. S.)
611. However, in Kentucky, this rule has been to a degree modified
with respect to automobiles by the "family purpose doctrine" which
makes the parent liable for injury done by a car on a highway when
driven by the infant child of the owner. The theory is that the car
is being used by the child with the direction of the parent or with his
consent and for the purpose for which the car was intended when purchased, and therefore the child is the agent of the parent in the op-
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eration of the car. Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52; Honland
v. Good, 188 Ky. 525, 222 S. W. 950; Doss v. Monticello Co., 193 Ky.
499, 236 S. W. 1046.
This principle is predicated on the theory that the child is the
agent of the father for the operation of the car, and therefore, results in the conclusion that the father, to be held for any such injury
caused by a minor child, can be liable only when a relationship, either
express or implied, of principal and agent is proved. Moreover, it is
definitely settled that the "family purpose" doctrine has no application
to cases where the child surreptitiously obtains possession of the car
and without the knowledge or consent of the parent operates it upon
the highway. Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95; Jensen v. Fischer, 134
Minn. 366; Cohen v. Meagor, 119 Va. 429; Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1;
Row v. Stoddard, 225 S. W. 836. The question, then, to determine in
the case at hand, is whether W. obtained and used the car in the
capacity of agent for his father. The facts of the present case tend
clearly to show that W. received no authority from S. when he took
the car and used it. The fact thaJ he was not accustomed to driving,
that he took the car stealthily and without knowledge or consent of his
father and against his consent, are all indicative of no implied or express assent on the part of S. and therefore show that no relationship
of -agency existed. Since no principal agent status can be shown, the
"family purpose" doctrine can not apply and the common law principle
that the father is not liable will therefore prevail. Norton v. Hall, 149
Ark. 428, 232 S. W. 934; Myers v. Shipley, 116 Atl. (Md.) 645; Stowe v.
Morris, 147 Ky. 388, 144 S. W. 52; Prattv. Cloudier, 110 Atl. (Me.) 353.
The upper court correctly reversed the decision of the lower court and
found the father not liable. Jones v. Cook, 123 S. E. (W. Va.) 407;
StuMpf, et ux. v. Montgomery, 226 Pac. 65, 101 Okla. 257; Clawson v.
Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 208 Pac. 924; Myers, et al. v. Shipley, 116 Atl.
645, 140 Md. 380; Geffert v. Kayser, 179 Wis. 571, 192 N. W. 26; Row.land v. Spalti, 196 Ia. 208, 194 N. W. 90.
-i.
F.

MINES AND MINERALs-DAMAOES WHERE CoAL WAS TAKEN IN Goon
FAITH.-H. and family conveyed a tract of land containing 247 acres to
S. who conveyed the same to the Harris Stanley Coal and Land Co., a
corporation. The corporation leased the said land to D. as trustee, and
in that capacity D. assigned the lease to the appellant.
In the original deed from the H. family there was a reservation of
an acre for a cemetery, a description of which was set out in the deed.
This same acre was reserved in the second conveyance. The lease to D.
and its assignment to the appellant referred to the S. deed for a description. A survey, after the second conveyance, by one P. showed
that there was an error in locating the acre reservation. The appellant
mined from one to two thousand tons of coal from under this reservation; and defends this action brought by the appellee to recover for the
value of the coal at the tipple on the theory that it followed the P.
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survey and map and in good faith mined the coal in question, and was
unaware of having crossed the line of the original reservation. Held,
the measure of damages to be the value in the earth. Middle Creek Coal
Co. v. Harris,205 Ky. 119.
The measure of damages depends upon the fact of the trespass, i. e.,
whether the trespass was willful or innocent. The test to determine
the willfulness or the innocence of the trespasser is by his honest belief and actual intention at the time he committed the trespass. U. S.
v. Homstake Min. Co., 117 Fed. 481. There is a lower measure of damages where the trespass is committed in good faith and without willful
intentions. In Montrozona Gol Min. Co. v. Thatcher, 75 Pac. (Colo.)
591, where there was a mistake as to the forfeiture of the lease and the
lessees continued to sink the shaft for nine days, the court held that
no willful trespass was committed. In Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v.
Fortune Gold Min. Co., 129 Fed. 668, where there was a mistake as to
boundaries, the court said, "One who takes such ore without right, but
inadvertently and unintentionally, or in the honest belief that he is
exercising his own right, is not a willful trespasser." The court further
said in the same case, "Mere negligence in ascertaining the limits of
the lands or rights will not alone sustain a finding of a willful trespass.
However, an intentional omission to exercise care to ascertain such
limits or a reckless disregard of them is fatal to the claim of the
trespasser to limit damages to the lower measure."
The measure of the damages is the value of the ore taken prior
to the institution of the suit. Cheesman v. Shrewe, 40 Fed. 787. Or
the measure of damages for the wrongful conversion is the value of the
stone After being cut and removed to its destination. Baker v. Hart,
5 N. Y. Supp. 345. Or the damage is the permanent injury done to the
freehold, plus the value of the coal mined, without any allowance for
the cost of mining the coal. Sunnyside Coal & Coke Co. v. Reitz, 39
N. E. 541 (Ind.). Where the trespass is not willful the reasonable
royalty paid for the coal is the measure of damages. Burke Hollow
Coal Go. v. Lawson, 151 Ky. 305.
-H. H. G.

MuNIcxPAL CORORATIONS--LIABILITY OF CrrY FOR BREAcH OF CoxTRACT FOR PAILURE To FupnxSH WATEa F0R FiRE PROTECTIO-WATME AND
WATER CouRss.-An action was brought against the city of Elizabethtown and the Kentucky Utilities Company for damages which the appellants allege they suffered when their home was destroyed by fire.
The appellants allege that the basis of their cause of action against the
city was that the city had specially contracted to furnish water for
fire protection to plaintiff and that it had failed to carry out its obligation under the contract; and against the utilities company for failing
to furnish power for operating the motors, which was in violation of
the terms of the contract of that company with the city.
As to the Utilities Company the law imposed no duty upon it to
furnish power to the city for pumping its water. This company was
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not a party to any contract with the appellants. The city alone could
maintain the action against it. The contract with them was for the
benefit of the city and not directly for the benefit of any or all of the
residents of the city.
The city of Elizabethtown having entered thfe field of commerce
Is liable in damages resulting in its failure to furnish water for domestic purposes and fire protection where the same has been applied
and paid for by any of its residenats. Phillips, et al. v. Zentucky Utilities Co., et aL, 266 S. W. 1064, 206 Ky. 151.
Fire protection is a service furnished by the municipality to all
of its residents and without making special charges therefor the city
is not liable. The power conferred upon a city or corporation to establish a fire department is a discretionary power which is within the discretion of the city authorities to exercise or not. Heller v. Sedalia, 53
Mo. 159. In Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420, where power was given to the
city to make and establish a number of reservoirs for fire protection,
the same having fallen into decay thruwant of repairs; the court held
in an action against the city that the city was not liable, its powers
being discretionary.
In Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 253, even though the city imposed
a tax and owned its own waterworks there was no duty upon the city
to furnish adequate fire protection. The court here stated that public
policy forbade such an action.
Even a failure to furnish suitable streets or sidewalks, or to maintain them, does not, of itself alone, render the city liable. "The injury
sustained must be something more than the lack of facility or means of
accomplishing an ulterior result. The power on the part of a municipal
corporation to provide for the accomplishment of a certain result does
not necessarily impose a liability for the imperfect accomplishment of
the same." Vanhorn v. City of Des Moines, 19 N. W. 293.
The city of Louisville in constructing and controlling fire cisterns
was held to be discharging governmental functions in acting with
respect to them, and was held not liable to a property owner for damages sustained by reason of being unable to obtain a water supply because of a defective valve in one cistern and because another was so
covered with snow that it could not be immediately located. Terrell v.
Louisville Water Co., 127 Ky. 77.
From a general summary of the decisions touching upon the particular question under consideration in this case one can readily see
that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the rule is that
the municipality is not liable for failure to furnish adequate fire protection in the absence of a special contract, where the resident has ap-H. H. G.
plied and paid for such service.

PARTNERSSRP-SETTLEBENT ExcLusIvELY COGNIzABLE iN EQurryPARTNER SUIG Co-PARTNER BETORE SETTI EMNT-A wife sued her husmand and one J., alleging that the two defendants were partners in
a restaurant business, and that they owed her for services rendered
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the partnership. She further claimed that J. had made a fraudulentconveyance of partnership property and set out grounds of attachment.
The second paragraph of the answer was a counterclaim alleging that
the plaintiff and her husband were co-partners with the defendant;
asked for a reference to the master commissioner for an accounting
and settlement and an adjustment of the equities between the parties.
The attorney for the defense moved for a transference to the equity
docket, which motion was denied and a trial had. Held that a settlement of partnership affairs was exclusively cognizable in equity and
that generally one might not bring a raw action against a co-partner
before an accounting and settlement. Jesse v. Slaugkter, 205 Ky. 271.
The courts of this country have generally held strictly to the rule
that the affairs of partnership settlement are matters for the exclusive
jurisdiction of chancery. The court in the case of George v. Pfel, 158
Ill. App. 261, said that chancery has exclusive jurisdiction with respect
to partnership accounting. The same court in the decision on the case
of Constas v. Grogoris-, 192 Il1. App. 376, says that a dispute between
partners concerning the dissolution of the partnership and an accounting forms the proper basis for the exercise of equity jurisdiction.
The Kentucky courts have held that the proper place for an accounting was the courts of equity as the common law action of account had been supplanted by equity. Neel v. Keel, 4 T. B. Mon. 162.
The courts of Kentucky and those of most other states early laid
down the rule that there should be no law action between co-partners
before an accounting and settlement in equity. In Shearer v. Francis,
9 K. L. R. 556, the court holds that where plaintiff had gotten out an
attachment, the disposition of the attachment should await a settlement in equity. In Stone v. Mattingly, 14 K. L. R. 113, the court held
that no action could be maintained on a contract for agreed compensation for services prior to settlement. The court in Ferre v. Coulson, 27
K. L. R. 451, lays down the doctrine that, "prior to the settlement of
the partnership account and the striking of a balance, one partner can
not maintain an action at law against his partner on a claim growing
out of the partnership."
Other cases in point are: Lawrence v. Clark, 9 Dana (Ky.) 259;
Croft v. Bain, 49 Mont. 484; Lamalere v. Coze, Fed. Cas. No. 8,003;
Elmer v. Hall, 148 Pa. 345; Buell v. Cole, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 353.
-W. B.

SALEs-DEIVEaY AND AccEPTANCE NECESSAY-RrTA1IN1G GooDs
Tinu THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN Ee0LYrE.-Appellants are
shoe manufacturers in Mass. On November 16, 1919, appellees, merchants in Hopkinsville, signed an order that appellants make and
send them a certain number of shoes for the spring trade, the shoes,
in question "to be shipped by rail on or about February 15, 1920."
The appellants made the shoes but did not ship them until March 31;
by reason of a railroad strike they did not reach appellees until June
4 when they were delivered to appellees, and the boxes were sent to the
FIVE MONTHS
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shoe department where they remained unopened until November 4.
The appellees then refused to accept the shoes and returned them to appellants who declined to receive them and they were sold by the railroad for charges. The appellants brought suit against the merchant to
recover $435.00, the price of the shoes, and the appellees refused to pay
on the ground that they had never accepted them. The court held
that on account of the instability of the price of shoes the seller is
entitled to notice of rejection; to constitute a sale there must be both
delivery and acceptance of the goods; and retention of the goods five
months, because of negligence of an employe in examining them
promptly after receipt thereof, amounted to acceptance. Cogan v. 'Wall
and McGowan, 206 Ky. 89.
The appellant had made delivery. Where goods of certain character are ordered and the buyer directs that they be sent by a common
carrier, or delivery to a common carrier to be sent to the buyer is the
evident intent, the property passes as soon as the goods are put in the
carrier's possession. Woodbine ChildreW's Clothing Co. v. Goldnamer,
134 Ky. 538, 121 S. W. 444. As a general rule in the case of executory
contracts of sale, the buyer is entitled to fair opportunity to inspect
the article tendered to see if it conforms to the contract and if not, to
reject it, 23 R. C. L. 1432. The buyer is not precluded from objecting
to them by merely receiving them, but receipt becomes acceptance if
the right to reject is not exercised within a reasonable time. Overman
and Schrader v. Nelson Bros., 15 Ky. L. R. 92.
Reasonableness of time is a question of fact to be determined by
the jury. One month was a reasonable time in the case of Pierson v.
Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539, 22 N. E. 349. And the Kentucky court has held
as a matter of law that sixty days was an unreasonable time for a retail merchant to retain a consignment of goods without notifying the
seller of rejection. Hellmers v. Norris, 201 Ky. 401, 257 S. W. 4.
-B. K. MI.

SUBSCRIPTION-WlITTEN INSTRUMENT FIr.ED AS ExnIBIT wAS NOT A.

SusciRIPTioN-OnAL SuciRipTioN.--D. instituted an action against L.
to recover $500.00 alleged to have been orally subscribed by L. to a
school district for the purpose of purchasing land on which to erect
a school building. D. filed with his petition a written instrument signed
by another party for L. as an exhibit and evidence of the subscription.
L., by demurrer, claimed the instrument could not be construed as a
subscription. Judgment for*D. Lewis v. Durham,, 265 S. W. 934, 205
Ky. 403.
The question as to whether an oral promise evidenced by a written
instrument signed by another party for the one to be charged is a subscription, is a new one in Kentucky. In Pomeroy v. Fullerton, 113 Mo.
440, 21 S. W. 19, the court said: "It has been held that exhibits filed
with a petition form no part thereof and cannot be considered in determining its sufficiency on demurrer." In this case this point is not
the one upon which the decision is based; therefore we may dismiss
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It bylsaying, "If the exhibit is not the foundation for the cause of
action or of the defense, it will not be considered." Barnes v. Moury,
129 Ind. 568, 28 N. E. 535.
Oral subscriptions have been sustained as a general rule. Ruten,
beck v. Hohn, 143 Ia. 13, 121 N. W. 698, 136 A. S. R. 731 and note. However, there is authority the other way. Fanning v. Hibernia Insurance
Co., 37 Ohio St. 339, 41 Am. Rep. 577.
This case can be placed in the same class with those which have
decided that oral promises to contribute specified sums for the erection of a public building are binding. George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533,
17 Am. Dec. 446. Therefore, the rule will apply that it is not necessary
for the contract to be in writing unless required by the charter or by
statute. 'Walter v. Merced Academy Association, 59 Pac. 136, 126 Cal.
582.
A strict definition of the word subscription involves the idea of a
written signature, yet by common usage it is often employed to include
an agreement, written or oral, to give or pay some amount to a designated purpose, more usually perhaps, to some purpose for the promotion of which numerous persons are uniting their means and their
efforts. -Yulton v. Clayton, 54 Ia. 425, 6 N. W. 685, 37 Am. Rep. 43.
The Kentucky court by their decision in this case seem to think an
oral subscription binding, and therefore have decided with the weight
of authority.
-R. C. S.

!

WILLS-CONVEYANCE RESERVING LIFE ESTATE IN GRANTOR is DEED,
AND) NoT WL--TRANSFER OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, TO TAKE EFFECT ArEa
DEATH OF GRANTOR, NOT EFFECTIVE, UNLEss AUTHENTICATED AS WILT.Plaintiff's testator, owner of a large farm, made a deed of conveyance of his whole estate to the appellee for the purpose of establishing
an industrial school for poor children, reserving a life estate in himself. The instrument was duly executed and acknowledged by the testator and recorded in the county clerk's office. It was also duly accepted and acknowledged by the appellee, and this acceptance was also
recorded in the same county clerk's office. From a decision of the
lower court that the testator at the time of execution of the deed had
sufficient mind and memory to make said deed, this appeal is brought.
The judgment was affirmed by the appellate court. Snyder, et al. v.
General Conference Board of Education of Methodist Episcopal Church.
South, et al., 205 Ky. 812, 266 S. W. 661.
The principal question urged by the appellant is that the instrument was testamentary in its effect, and not being properly executed
as a will, was therefore ineffective. The law favors construction of a
will which will vest the estate. Olney v. Hull, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 311;
King v. King, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 205, 37 Am. Dec. 459. The early common
law of England laid down the d6ctrine that gifts to charitable uses
should be highly favored and construed by the most liberal judicial
rules rather than that the gift should fall, and the intent of the donor
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fail of accomplishment. Dykeman v. Jenkines, 179 Ind. 549, 101 N. E.
1013; Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 82 N. W. 345. Our state and
federal courts have adopted the same principle and regard devises as
privileged testaments entitled to peculiar favor, and the courts of equity
go to the length of their power rather than such a trust should fail.
PhiladelphiaBaptist Assoc. v. Smith, 7 U. S. (Law Ed.) 749; Auld V.
Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; Speer v. Colbert, 200 U. S. 130;
Johnston v. Holtfield, 79 Ala. 423; Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Nat.
Library Assn., 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W. 155; Johnston v. Johnston, 92 Tenn.
559, 23 S. W. 114. If the instrument can be construed in two ways, one
of which would turn a gift into an illegal trust, while the other would
be valid and operative, the latter construction must be preferred. In re
Robinson's Will, 203 N. Y. 380, 96 N. E. 925; Dailey v. New Haven, 60
Conn. 314, 22 Atl. 945; Congregational Church Bldg. Soc. v. Everett, 85
Md. 79, 36 Ati. 654. The true"test in such cases is the intention of the
maker. Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 59 Pac. 1059; Nolan v. Otney, 75
Kan. 311, 89 Pac. 690; Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S. W. 998.
Where an instrument, expressly reserves possession of the property until the grantor's death, and uses terms common in deeds throughout, it will be held a deed, and not a will, on the theory that no words
postponing possession until death would be necessary in a will. Robertson v. Dunn, 6 N. C. 133, 5 Am. Dec. 525. It is also true that if the
grantor in an instrument purporting to be a deed intends that title
shall remain in him until his death and then pass to the grantee, his
intent will be held to be testamentary in character and hence incapable
of consummation by a deed. Wilson v. Wilson, 153 Ill. 567, 41 N. E.
1007; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 984; Murphy v. Gab.
bert, 166 Mo. 596, 66 S. W. 536; Watkins v. Dean, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 321,
31 Am. Dec. 583. However, an instrument executed and delivered and
where the intention appears presently to transfer the title, it will be
construed to be a deed. Evenson v. Webster, 3 S. D. 382, 53 N. W. 747.
In Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, an instrument reciting "this instrument
is not to take effect until the death of the said parties of the first part,
do hereby sell and convey to the parties of the second part, the following described property," was held to be a deed and not a will, conveying to the grantee a present estate, vesting at the time of its delivery, and taking effect in possession at the death of the grantors. Similiarly in Phillips,et al. v. Thomas Lumber Company, 94 Ky. 445, the
court held the instrument to be a deed taking effect at once, and reserving to the grantor merely a life estate (the deed having been recorded), which recited that the maker "deeds" certain land to his wife
and at her death to go to his grandson, also that "this deed is not to
take effect" until his death, and'that he is "to have and keep full possession of said farm during his life."
The transfer -of personal property falls within a different rule of
law, and it is held that where the possession and control of personal
property is retained by the donor, and which is not to take effect until
after his death, is to be regarded as a will, and is not effective unless
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authenticated as such. Bimon v. WiWlt, 84 Ky. 158; Rtdu
v. Budd,
184 Ky. 400, 214 S. W. 791; Morrison v. Bartlett, 148 Ky. 384, 147 S. W.
761.
It has been settled that a conveyance may be made of land, reserving to the grantor a life estate therein. While testamentary in character, such an instrument is held to be a deed of conveyance, and not a
will. TWood v. Moss, 176 Ky. 419; Best v. Hovse (Ky.) 113 S. W. 849.
The'present case was decided in accordance with the great weight
of authority and the court held that the conveyance, reserving a life
-W. F. S.
estate In the grantor, was a "deed" and not a will.

